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Introduction
There has been some speculation as to whether belligerents' rights still
exist in the U.N. Charter period or not. The question is closely connected
with the problem of whether the law of neutrality continues to exist-the
duties of neutrals being, to a large extent, correlative to the rights of bel-
ligerents. There are several schools of thought on this question. One con-
tends that traditional belligerents' rights continue to exist, along with the
law of neutrality.' Another insists that the U.N. Charter has abolished war
as a legal institution and that it has, accordingly, thereby also abolished
the traditional rights of belligerents along with the law of neutrality.
2
Finally, there is a middle ground between these two which contends that,
although belligerents' rights as such no longer exist, they have in effect
donned newjuridical clothing and reappeared as incidents of the exercise
of the right of self-defense.3 The implication of the second and third of
these approaches is that the traditional law of neutrality no longer exists.
None of these approaches is persuasive. The first one, that belliger-
ents' rights still exist, seems to take insufficient account of the U.N. Char-
ter's abolition of the "use of force." It seems undesirable to hold that the
resort to force is unlawful while at the same time contending that if such a
resort is made, the state should automatically be given certain important
legal privileges as, in effect, a reward for breaking the law. The second
position, that belligerents' rights have been abolished along with war,
seems to fly in the face of state practice. The fact is that states have
1. Robert R. Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force under the Char-
ter, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 68, 71-72 (1968);JosefL. Kunz, TheLaws of War, 50 AM.J.
INT'L L. 313 (1956). Much of the writing in this vein has been oriented towards giving
an affirmative answer to the question of whether the law of neutrality continues to exist.
See Titus Komarnicki, The Place of Neutrality in the Modem System of International Law, 80
RECUEIL DES COUtS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 395, 464502
(1952-1); ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALIT' AT SEA 171-80 (1955);J.
PEREZ MONTERo, LA NEUTRALIDAD EN EL PRESENTE (1958); D.W. BowETrr, SELF-DEFENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 174-81 (1958); A. Galina, Neutrality in Contemporary International
Law, 1958 SOvIET Y.B. INT'L L. 225; JuLius STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT- A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF DispuTEs- AND WAR-LAw 382 (1973); Moans
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 522-26 (1959); MYERS S. McDouCAL &
FLORENTINO FELICIANo, AW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 398-400, 427-35 (1961); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 404 (1963); Dietrich Schindler, Aspects
Contemporains de la Neutralit4 121 R.CAD.I. 221, 261-77 (1967-11); Walter L. Williams,
Jr., Neutrality in Modem Armed Conflicts: A Survey of the Developing Law, 90 MIL. L. REv. 9,
17-27 (1980); Bruce Harlow, The Law of Neutraliy at Sea for the '80s and Beyond, 3 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 42 (1984); Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem Interna-
tional Law, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 283, 297-301 (1987). See also the separate opinion of
Vice-President Ammoun in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), 1971 IC.J. 16, 92-99 (June 21).
2. LoRD McNAIR & A.D. WA-rs, THE LEGAL EFFETars OF WAR 457 (4th ed. 1966);
L.G. Fenwick, Is Neutrality Still a Term of Present Law, 63 AM.J. INT'L L. 100 (1969).
3. Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the "State of War", 62 AM. SOC. INT'L L.
PROC. 58 (1968); Christopher Gree, Comment, in THE GULF WAR OF 1980-1988: THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTrvE 212, 215-16 (Ige F. Dekker &
Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE GULF WAR OF 1980-1988].
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claimed and exercised many of the traditional rights of belligerents with-
out undue objection from other states. The evidence from state practice is
that the law of neutrality has survived into the U.N. Charter era.4 Finally,
the "middle ground" approach suffers from two defects. First, it
introduces a disturbing element of asymmetry into the laws of armed con-
flict-a body of law in which even-handedness has traditionally been a fun-
damental principle. This is because the rights pertaining to self-defense
are, by the nature of self-defense itself, available only to the victim of an
attack, not to the aggressor. The second and perhaps more serious defect
is that this thesis adequately explains only one category of belligerents'
rights: those rights exercised by defending states against aggressors, such
as the right to take and hold prisoners, to occupy territory, and to confis-
cate private property at sea. It fails to explain satisfactorily why certain
belligerents' rights should be exercisable against third parties (i.e., against
neutrals) who are not guilty of aggression. The obvious examples are the
right of visit and search, confiscation of contraband, and condemnation
for blockade violation.
This article proposes a remedy for these defects. The proposed solu-
tion is, in essence, to consign the traditional corpus of belligerents' rights
and neutrals' duties to history and to substitute for them a set of analo-
gous-but not identical-rights and duties that will take the fullest
account of the modem law of the U.N. Charter. According to this pro-
posed analysis, there will no longer be such a thing as a state of war.
Instead, there will be an analogous-but non-forcible-relationship of
hostility between enemy states, which will be governed by a set of rules that
will replace the traditional law of belligerents' rights and of neutrality. In
fact, it seems that, for lack of a better alternative, the term "hostility" is a
good one to adopt as a proposed technical legal term to refer to this new
legal relationship and the new set of legal rules that will govern it.
5
The outstanding feature of this proposed relationship of hostility is
that it gives rise to a set of rights on the part of the hostile states which may
be provisionally termed, again for lack of a better term, "hostility-related
rights." As this proposed legal state of hostility is the post-U.N. Charter
equivalent of the old institution of war, these hostility-related rights will be
seen as the post-Charter analogue of traditional belligerents' rights. At
the same time, hostility-related rights will function as the post-Charter ana-
logue of the classical law of neutrality.
This article elaborates on the law that will govern this proposed legal
status of hostility. It is entirely de legeferend a-it is a discussion of the law as
4. For an informative general survey of the extent to which the law of neutrality
(including the exercise of belligerents' rights vis-d-vis neutrals) continues to exist in
state practice, see Patrick M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the
Law of Neutrality, 17 HARV. INT'L .JU. 249 (1976).
5. "Confrontation" is a possible label but that would seem too reminiscent of the
Indonesian "confrontation" campaign against Malaysia in the early 1960s in response to
the entry of the Borneo provinces of Sabah and Sarawak into the Malaysian federation.
On this incident, see RIcHARD FALU, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 91-
125 (1970).
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it ought to be, not as it presently stands. It should be stressed, however,
that this proposal is resolutely non-utopian. It makes very substantial con-
cessions to the realities of state practice-to the point that it may be open
to the charge of conceding too much to reality and too little to idealism.
To some, the proposed hostility-related rights will seem too strongly remi-
niscent of the old belligerents' rights. But there will be important differ-
ences, both in their juridical bases and in their detailed contents, as the
discussion will demonstrate in due course. The single most important dif-
ference is that all hostility-related measures will be required to be non-
forcible in character.
Part I of the Article sets out the general character of the proposed
legal status of hostility and of the rights ancillary to it. Part II discusses in
greater detail particular hostility-related rights, while part III examines the
relationship between this law of hostility and various other norms of inter-
national law. Part IV provides some demonstrations of the utility of this
mode of analysis by looking briefly at the legal aspects of several interna-
tional crises and pointing out the superiority of an analysis along the lines
proposed. The Article ends with a brief conclusion.
I. The General Nature of Hostility-related Rights
A. General Considerations
The law relating to the proposed status of hostility is to be, in brief, the
modern non-forcible counterpart of the traditional law of war and neutral-
ity. Entering into a state of hostility will constitute, in effect, the prosecu-
tion of a conflict without the use of force. War properly speaking is to be
consigned unambiguously and unceremoniously to history, no longer
"recognised" (in Oppenheim's cautious phraseology) 6 by international
law. Because there is no longer such a thing as war, it necessarily follows
that there cannot any longer be such a thing as belligerents' rights, since
those rights spring from a state of war. By the same token, the traditional
law of neutrality will be banished from modern international law.
In place of the now-discarded legal status of war will be the proposed
legal status of hostility, and in place of the now-discarded belligerents'
rights will be the proposed set of hostility-related rights. These hostility-
related rights will bear some resemblance to traditional belligerents'
rights,7 but there will be an important distinction. Belligerents' rights
were seen as inherent rights of states at war, triggered by the inauguration
of the state of war. To be sure, the laws of war regulated belligerents'
rights, but they did not create them. That is to say, the laws of war did not
confer the rights of belligerents onto the parties; they merely regulated
their exercise.
It will be otherwise with the hostility-related rights. These should not
be seen as inherent rights of parties in a hostility relationship. Rather,
6. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE § 54 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952).
7. See infra part 1I.C.
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they will be created, defined, and regulated by the law relating to hostility
itself. The hostility-related rights, in other words, are best regarded as
"gifts" to the hostile parties, freely given by the international community at
large. But these rights will be conceded only grudgingly, and they will be
freely alterable, even revocable, by the community at large. The reason is
quite simple. The real purpose of these rights is to safeguard interna-
tional peace and security for the international community at large, not to
enable the hostile parties to injure one another or third parties with maxi-
mum efficiency. As the purpose of the law of hostility is to restrict and
contain conflict between states, the law should be restrictive rather than
permissive in character. The hostility-related rights are granted to the
contending parties on the thesis that, if they were not so conferred, the
conflict might assume a more serious form. Furthermore, the specific
rights are to be hedged with restrictions.
8
We must stress at the outset two overriding restrictions upon the hos-
tility-related rights. First, they must be non-forcible in character in order
to conform to the U.N. Charter's prohibition against the use of force set
out in article 2(4). 9 Second, these rights must not prejudice the funda-
mental right of self-defense, which the U.N. Charter expressly preserves in
article 51. This last point is, however, subject to the important caveat that
the law relating to hostility will entail a certain redefining of the scope of
the right of self-defense.' 0 But the right as such must be carefully
preserved.
Hostility-related rights share one important feature with traditional
belligerents' rights: the principle of reciprocity. Each hostile party will be
equally entitled to exercise the rights, regardless of the legal merits of the
underlying legal dispute between them. This requirement has an immedi-
ate consequence-a state cannot exercise hostility-related rights without
automatically conceding the same prerogative to its opponent."1
8. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4
(1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommenda-
tion of the Security Council.).
10. See infta text accompanying note 40.
11. The claiming of hostility-related rights will therefore be analogous to a recogni-
tion of belligerency. The analogy will not be precise, however, because the recognition
will be by the contending parties themselves rather than by third parties. Notable
examples occurred in the Greek War of Independence and the American Civil War.
But it seems fair to say that in cases where established governments exercised belliger-
ents' rights in the subduing of insurgencies, they thereby tacitly recognized the belliger-
ent status of their foes. The American Civil War is the most notable example of this.
Another is the Algerian independence struggle, in which France exercised the right of
visit and search of third-party ships at sea in an effort to halt weapons supplies to the
insurgents. On this policy, see Laurent Lucchini, Actes de Contrainte Exercs par la France
en Haute Mer au Cours des Operations en Algirie, 1966 ANuAltn FRaN.cAs DE DRorr INT=-
NATIONAL (Centre National de Ia Recherche Scientifique) 805.
Cornell International Law Journal
B. Hostility-related Rights of the Hostile Parties Against One Another
Hostility-related rights can be grouped into two categories: rights of the
hostile states vis-d-vis one another and rights of the hostile states vis-a-vis
third parties. Regarding the rights of the hostile countries against each
other, the law is already tolerably well developed in the form of the gen-
eral law relating to countermeasures.1 2 There is accordingly no need for a
detailed discussion here. It should suffice simply to stress the single most
outstanding feature of this body of law: it does not include the right to use
force, since that would violate article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
C. Hostility-related Rights of the Hostile Parties Against Third States
The second category of hostility-related rights, those exercisable against
third parties, is the principal concern of this discussion. Herein lies the
principal difference between countermeasures on the one hand and the
proposed hostility-related rights on the other. The general view is that
countermeasures, which are by definition responses to prior unlawful con-
duct, can be invoked only against the actual wrongdoing state, not against
third parties.13 Hostility-related measures, in contrast, are not necessarily
based on prior unlawful conduct by the opposing state, but merely on the
existence of a dispute of any character. In this respect, the proposed law
of hostility would therefore be the modern counterpart of the traditional
law of war, whereas the present law of countermeasures is the modern
counterpart of the traditional law of reprisal. Both of these modern bod-
ies of law differ from their traditional ancestors in that both rule out any
resort to force in violation of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
In its effects on third parties, the proposed law of hostility will func-
tion as the modern analogue and replacement of one vital component of
the traditional law of war: the traditional law of neutrality. There will,
however, be some significant differences. One crucial difference (noted
above) is that these hostility-related rights, unlike traditional belligerents'
rights vis-d-vis neutrals, are not to be seen as inherent rights of the hostile
states, but rather as gifts to them from the international community at
large. In addition, certain of the traditional rights of belligerents against
neutrals must be excluded from this category because of the general
requirement (also noted above) that these hostility-related rights must be
non-forcible in character. As a consequence, these rights must therefore
exclude such robust measures against neutrals as forcible reprisals or the
sinking of neutral ships.14
12. See generally OMER YousuF ELAGAB, THE LEGALrrY oF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-
MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1988).
13. For example, draft article 14 of part II of the International Law Commission's
draft articles on state responsibility flatly prohibits countermeasures against third par-
ties. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-fourth Session, 4 May -
24July 1992, 47 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 73 n.48, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
14. On the sinking of neutral ships, see TuCKER, supra note 1, at 344-54. On a
related matter, see Quincy Wright, The Destruction of Neutral Property on Enemy Vessels, 11
AM.J. INT'L L. 358 (1917). The taking of forcible reprisals by belligerents against neu-
trals was actually virtually unknown in practice in the pre-U.N. Charter period. Ironi-
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The potential importance of measures exercisable against third states
should not be underestimated. Practicing statesmen have appreciated
that one potentially important strategy of conflict is the interference with
relations between their primary foes and third parties. The most notable
illustrations from the pre-U.N. era were the Allied "blockade," or eco-
nomic warfare, policies of the two world wars. These entailed pressuring
the enemy by means of restricting its contacts with neutral third states.
15
We shall consider further examples of this character in the post-U.N.
period presently.
D. Inaugurating a State of Hostility
The question of the formalities involved in the inauguration of a hostility
relationship calls for some attention. It is important that the international
community at large knows as unambiguously as possible whether a state of
hostility exists or not. The reason is obvious: the principal hostility-
related measures will be applied against neutral third states, so it is a mat-
ter of elementary fairness that those states know when they are exposed to
them. It is not proposed, however, that the issuing of formal "declarations
of hostility" be required, although it seems reasonable to permit states to
issue them if they wish, in the interest of clarity. Instead, it is suggested
that any attempt by a state to exercise hostility-related rights should be
deemed to constitute formal notice to the international community that a
state of hostility exists. This, of course, adds to the importance of defining
the hostility-related rights as precisely as possible in order to enable a pre-
cise pinpointing of the moment the relationship arises.
It would seem reasonable to require states that resort to hostility-
related measures to give a formal statement of their reasons for so doing
to the U.N. Security Council for general publication. This requirement is
not particularly burdensome or innovative. In past crises, states taking
extraordinary measures have informed the United Nations of the steps
taken and the justifications for them. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Viet-
cally, one illustration of this right being claimed comes from the post-U.N. Charter
era-by Israel, in its attack on the Beirut airport in 1968. See Richard A. Falk, The Beirut
Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 415 (1969); Yehuda Z.
Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard. A Reply to Professor Richard A.
Falk, 64 Am.J. INT'L L. 73 (1970).
15. These economic warfare policies, however, operated in conjunction with mili-
tary measures, not as a complete alternative to them. For short accounts of the World
War I blockade, see CHARLES SEYMOUR, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE WORLD WAR
26-39 (1934); EDWiN BORCHARD & WILLIAM Por-ER LAGE, NEUTRALTrY FOR THE UNITED
STATES 198-211 (2d ed. 1939); EDGAR TuRLiNG'rON, NEUTRALITY. ITs HISTORY, ECONOM-
ICS AND LAW 48-66 (1986); GERD HARDACH, THE Fmrs WORLD WAR, 1914-1918, at 11-34
(P. Ross & B. Ross trans., 1977). For the British government's own description of the
blockade policy, see British Statement of the Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-borne Com-
merce of Germany, reprinted in 10 Am. J. I'rr'L L. 87 (Supp. 1916). For more comprehen-
sive accounts, see Louis GuICHARD, HisToi-E Du BLOcus NAVAL (1914-1918) (1929);
A.C. BELL, A HISrORY OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND
TURKEY, 1914-1918 (1937); MARION C. SiNE, THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, 1914-
1916 (1957). The leading account of the World War II blockade policy is W.N. MEDLI-
COTT, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (1978).
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nam War, the various Middle East conflicts, and the Falklands War all pro-
vide examples. One important innovation, however, is suggested: if the
Security Council deems that the situation does not warrant the application
of hostility-related measures, it should be able to prohibit the states from
resorting to them. It should not be necessary for the Security Council to
invoke Chapter VII of the Charter for this purpose. A simple resolution
should suffice under the Security Council's "general powers" to maintain
international peace and security.16 Any attempt to exercise hostility-
related rights in the face of such a prohibition would be unlawful, giving
rise to a duty on the part of the law-breaking state to provide compensa-
tion to all parties affected.
It may be wondered whether-and, if so, why-one state should be
able to force another unilaterally into a relationship of hostility with it,
either by a simple declaration or by some analogous means. In principle,
this should not be permitted, although in practice it is difficult to see how
it could be effectively avoided. If one state either makes a formal declara-
tion that a state of hostility exists, or simply begins unilaterally to exercise
hostility-related rights, then it should be open to the opposing state to
deny that a hostile relationship exists. Whether a hostility relationship
does or does not exist should, then, become an objective question which
in principle could be determined by some quasijudicial process, such as
arbitration.
In reality, though, it must be conceded that a state is likely to succeed
in foisting a hostility relationship onto another state in the way that states
formerly could, in effect if not in theory, foist a state of war onto another
state by a unilateral act.1 7 The practical reality is likely to be that a state
will be able unilaterally to institute a relation of hostility. It will be espe-
cially easy to do so in light of the fact that many of the most important
hostility-related rights are exercisable against third parties rather than
against the opposing state.' 8 It will be open to affected third parties to
make effective objection, i.e., to contend that the facts of the particular
situation do not justify a resort to hostility-related rights. But third states
may simply acquiesce. The opposing state is, of course, free to refrain
from exercising any hostility-related rights itself, but if it follows that
course, it may place itself at a disadvantage. It seems likely that political
pressures within the state would lead it to "fight fire with fire" by exercis-
ing hostility-related rights itself. Once that occurs, there will be no scope
16. On the existence of such "general powers," see Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16, para. 110 (June 21).
On the quasijudicial aspects of the Security Council's functioning, see EUHU LAUTER-
PACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINSTRATION OF INTERNATONALJuSTICE 37-48 (1991).
17. This was, admittedly, a murky area of the pre-League of Nations law of war.
18. See supra part I.C. The opposing state itself, as noted above, is subject to ordi-
nary countermeasures governed by the general law thereof. The legality of the counter-
measures taken by the state declaring the hostility relationship will be determined not
by the law of hostility per se, but rather by the legal character of the acts to which the
state is reacting.
Vol 28
1995 Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict
for either contending party to deny that a state of hostility existed.19
This is not, admittedly, a very satisfactory state of affairs. But several
factors should mitigate any unfairness that might arise. First, there will
surely be some stigma attached to instituting a hostility relationship unilat-
erally so that states will not lightly do so. Second, military action is
excluded by article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Consequently, any possible
advantage that powerful states hold over weak ones is thereby substantially
nullified. Finally, once the hostility relationship is in force, the rights of
the hostile parties become reciprocal and equal.2 0 Any unilateral claim to
hostility-related rights functions automatically as an admission that the
other side is entitled to follow suit.
There is one additional consideration that should be weighed in the
balance. Any state which enters into a hostility relationship with another
should thereby become required to submit the matter to a third-party dis-
pute settlement procedure. This is not much of an innovation, because
the U.N. Charter already requires states to resort to some kind of peaceful
settlement process in disputes that are likely to endanger international
peace.21 The present proposal goes beyond the Charter only in the sense
that, in a hostility situation, the use of procedures involving third parties
will be required.
There would seem to be no harm in permitting the hostile states to
institute such a process by agreement. Failing such agreement, though, a
standing procedure should be established whereby the Security Council or
the Secretary-General of the United Nations can convene a dispute settle-
ment panel. Whether the panel's decision should be legally binding on
the parties is a question that may be resolved in due course. Ideally, it
should be. If, however, this stands in the way of states' accepting this pro-
posed law of hostility, then non-binding settlement could be accepted.
H. The Contents of Hostility-related Rights
Since the hostility-related rights will not be inherent rights but rather will
be "gifts" of the international community,2 2 the international community
will have a free hand in fixing their parameters. The traditional belliger-
ents' rights, in other words, may serve as a rough guide to this new body of
law, but not as a dictatorial "dead hand."
In principle, the contents of the code of hostility-related rights would
be set down either in an international convention or an agreed set of gen-
eral principles. The models for a convention would be the Hague Con-
ventions on the Laws of War, or the Geneva Conventions and their two
Protocols. 23 It will be open to the international community to make alter-
19. It would still be open to third parties, however, to argue for such a denial.
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
22. See supra part lA.
23. For the texts of these agreements, see DocuMENs ON THE LAws OF WAR 43-119,
169-337, 387-446 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989). Another, less
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ations at any time. The problem of reaching agreement, of course, must
not be underestimated. The following suggestions may be provisionally
made regarding the contents of these rights.
A. Contraband
Foremost among the hostility-related rights will be that relating to contra-
band, i.e., the right of the hostile parties to interfere with the delivery of
weapons by third parties to their opponents. This is clearly analogous to
the traditional law of contraband from the old and now-discarded law of
neutrality. But this new law of contraband is not a straightforward borrow-
ing of the old one. It differs from the old law chiefly in that it is no more
than a right of the hostile state to prevent delivery of contraband goods to its
opponent. It should not have the right to confiscate them and turn them
to its own use as in the classical law of war and neutrality.
There are several alternatives here. One is to permit the destruction
of captured contraband. Another is to arrange for sequestration of some
kind, preferably in the hands of some designated third party. Perhaps a
hostile party could appoint an analogue of a protecting party under the
Geneva Conventions to undertake this warehousing task.
The best solution is probably to give the third party the option simply
to return to the point of departure, or to an alternate destination of its
choice, with the contraband material. Prize court proceedings would then
be necessary only if there were some question as to the contraband status
of the goods.2 4 Whichever of these solutions is adopted, the general
thrust of the law in this area is clear enough. It is to prevent the influx of
weaponry into areas of tension, a goal that is consonant with the interests
of the world at large. It is certainly not the purpose of this law to allow
belligerents to augment their arsenals by plundering neutral traders.
It may further be speculated that the existence of a recognized state
of hostility might well-and ought to-have the effect of stimulating third
states to take steps on their own initiative to embargo arms shipments by
their own nationals to the rival sides. There are many examples of such
policies in recent history, most notably during the India-Pakistan and vari-
ous Middle East conflicts. It may even be that the U.N. Security Council
would use its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to require states to
halt arms shipments as it has done in the crises in Yugoslavia and Somalia
in the 1990s.25 This proposed modified contraband right would neatly
reinforce such arms embargo policies. In addition, it may be noted that a
powerful state instituting a hostility relationship by exercising this right of
contraband would be taking a risk: by asserting the right, it might stimu-
successful, model was the Declaration of London of Feb. 26, 1909, which never entered
into force. For the text of this document, see 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1909).
24. For a discussion of this point, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
25. For the arms embargo against the states of the former Yugoslavia, see S.C. Res.
713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 42, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991). For the
arms embargo against Somalia, see S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg. at
55, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
Vol 28
1995 Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict
late third states or even the United Nations itself to adopt arms embargo
policies that would prejudice its own position.
The obvious and age-old difficulty concerning contraband is how to
determine what goods fall into this category. It would appear that, in the
light of widely varying circumstances of individual disputes and the gen-
eral rush of technological development, it is impossible to set down a fixed
contraband list of universal validity. The following is a potential solution
to this problem.
The formulation of contraband lists should not be the prerogative of
the hostile parties themselves but instead should be prepared by the U.N.
Security Council or by a committee thereof. The contending parties
should have the right to make representations to the committee as to what
goods should be placed on the list, as should third states whose trade will
be affected. The committee could perhaps decide on separate lists for the
two parties, although that would seem in general not to be desirable. The
committee's decision would of course be published and would constitute a
warning to all third parties that they carry such goods to either party at the
risk of interruption by the other.
The advantages of this proposal are obvious. Contraband lists would
be fixed not by the parties themselves, as has happened so often in the
past (notably in the world wars), but rather by the international commu-
nity at large. Also, contraband lists can be tailored with a high degree of
precision to the exigencies of the particular case. The committee can also
amend the lists from time to time, even during the continuation of the
crisis.
This proposal should not appear far-fetched. The Security Council
has already had some important and relevant experience in this area. In
the early 1950s, it formed a body called the Collective Measures Commit-
tee whose task, essentially, was to prepare the U.N. member-states for eco-
nomic sanctions programs. This committee duly compiled what were, in
effect, model contraband lists for application in cases of economic sanc-
tions.26 In addition, during the sanctions efforts that it has actually insti-
tuted, the Security Council has established committees to deal with the
many technical aspects connected with the embargoes.
27 This experience
26. Report of the Collective Measures Committee, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Suplp. No. 17, at
21-23, U.N. Doc. A/2215 (1952). The committee produced two lists: one of "Arms,.
Ammunition and Implements of War," and the other of "Strategic Items." These have a
direct and obvious analogy to the dichotomy in the traditional law of neutrality between
absolute contraband and conditional contraband.
27. For the establishment of a committee to oversee the Rhodesian sanctions of the
1960s and 1970s, see S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968). For the establishment of a similar committee to oversee the
South African arms embargo of 1977-94, see S.C. Res. 421, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2052d
mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977). For the establishment of a similar committee to
oversee the arms embargo against the states of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, see S.C.
Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess, 3023d mtg. at 45, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991). This
last committee was later entrusted with overseeing the general economic sanctions
imposed against Serbia and Montenegro. See S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3082d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
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should prove highly relevant to the task of preparing contraband lists.
One final point should be made on the subject of contraband. An
interesting and difficultjurisprudential issue might arise as to whether the
U.N. committee might be seen as itself making the trade in these contra-
band items unlawful, with the two hostile parties then entrusted with
enforcement of that U.N.-sourced legislation. On the whole, it would
seem preferable not to view the matter in this light because it would give
rise to worries on the part of U.N. member-states that the United Nations
is assuming supranational legislative powers which the Charter does not
grant it. It is better to say that publication of the contraband lists by the
committee constitutes a Security Council authorization to the hostile par-
ties to confiscate the goods as an exercise of their own hostility-related
rights.
B. Visit and Search
The traditional belligerent right of visit and search was basically precau-
tionary in nature. Since the seventeenth century, when it began to be reg-
ulated by treaty, it has assumed a well-governed and even ritualistic form.
2 8
Modem technology's principal contribution, demonstrated repeatedly in
the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s, is that the process is now sometimes
conducted by means of helicopter descents rather than by visits from
another ship. If carried out at sea, as was the traditional practice before
the two world wars, visit and search involved minimal interference with the
lawful activities of third parties. It seems that it therefore may safely be
allowed as a hostility-related right without undue prejudice to third
parties.
A difficult question regarding visit and search is how to deal with
ships that refuse to submit to it peaceably. The traditional answer was that
resistance by a neutral ship to visit and search made the ship good prize,
i.e., the ship could be captured and taken into prize for condemnation. It
is suggested that this should continue to be so. Otherwise, third parties
could simply strip the hostile states of this right by their own fiat.
Another question to be resolved is whether to allow the diversion of
ships into the searching state's ports or instead to require visit and search
to be conducted entirely at sea. It is suggested, necessarily tentatively, that
searches be required to take place at sea in the interest of minimizing
disruption to, and possible oppression of, third-party shipping. It is
important to ensure, as noted above, that these hostility-related rights not
be forcible in character; consequently, anything smacking of compulsory
diversion from planned trade routes should be severely frowned upon.
There is also the worrisome consideration for third parties that once a
ship has been diverted into a port of the visiting state, even if ostensibly
28. The regulation of the visit-and-search process was a constant feature of treaties
of friendship, commerce, and navigation from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centu-
ries. For one example among a multitude in existence, see Denmark-Norway-Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 6, 1748, arts. 22-23, 38
Consol. T.S. 205, 224-26, 233 (Clive Parry ed., 1969).
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merely for a precautionary search, it is then in the territory of the visiting
state and subject to the full range of that state's sovereign rights.
2 9
C. Exclusions: Blacklisting and Blockade
Several practices that have figured in past armed conflicts should be
explicitly understood not to fall into the category of hostility-related rights.
Blacklisting, for example, should not be permitted because it is an unrea-
sonable infringement of the general right of third parties to trade with
each of the hostile states.3 0 That is, states should not be permitted to boy-
cott persons in neutral countries simply because they trade with the oppos-
ing state. In short, "secondary boycotting" should not be allowed.
It may be noted that in this area, the law of hostility arguably consti-
tutes an abridgement rather than an expansion of the normal sovereign
rights of states. After all, it is arguable that a state, in adopting a blacklist-
ing policy, does nothing more than exercise its inherent sovereign right to
decide with whom it will and will not trade. It may be conceded, if only for
the sake of argument, that such a general sovereign right exists. But it is
suggested that the law relating to hostility should override that right in
favor of the right of third parties to trade as freely as possible with both
hostile countries. Hostile countries, in other words, should not be permit-
ted to exercise their "normal" sovereign rights in a manipulative fashion to
deny neutral countries their normal sovereign right to trade freely with
both sides.
3 '
Blockade likewise should be excluded from the list of hostility-related
rights on two grounds. First, like secondary boycotting, it infringes the
normal right of freedom of trade of third parties. Second, it is forcible in
character and consequently violates article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In
addition, blockade is expressly identified in the U.N. General Assembly's
"Definition of Aggression" as an act of aggression
3 2 As will be seen pres-
ently, however, there may be room for blockade-like policies under the
29. For a cogent discussion of the question of diversion of ships into belligerent
ports for visit and search, see TucYER, supra note 1, at 33844. For the leading British
prize law case on the subject, see The Falk, [1921] 1 App. Cas. 787 (P.C. 1921) (appeal
taken from P.) (upholding diversion). The leading French prize law case was The Fede-
rico, which also upheld diversion, concerning which see CJ. Colombos, Some Notes on the
Decisions of the French Prize Courts, 16J. Soc'y COMp. LEGIS. 300, 303-04 (1916).
30. That was the objection vigorously made by the United States when its nationals
and companies fell victim to the first sustained practice of blacklisting-by the Allied
powers during the First World War. SeeJames B. Scott, The Black List of Great Britain and
Her Allies, 10 Am. J. INT'L L 832 (1916); Thomas A. Bailey, The United States and the
Blacklist During the Great War, 6J. MOD. Hisr. 14 (1934); TuRUNGTON, supra note 15, at
80-86; AuCE M. MORMSSEV, THE AMmiCAN DEFENSE OF NEtrrAL RIGHTS 1914-1917, at
141-47 (1939).
31. See, e.g., Stephen C. Neff, Economic Waifare in Contemporary International Law:
Three Schools of Thought, Evaluated According to an Historical Method, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L.
67, 73-80 (1989). There is no doubt that this suggested ban on blacklisting would be
difficult to enforce in practice. But there should be no mistaking the point of principle
involved.
32. GA Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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rubric of self-defense;3 3 but blockade, like blacklisting, has no place
among the hostility-related rights.
D. Consequences of Over-stepping the Ambit of the Hostility-related
Rights
This matter poses little difficulty. Since hostility-related rights are to be
governed by a fixed code of rules, the clear consequence is that if either
hostile party strays outside the ambit of those rules, it violates the law and
owes compensation to the affected third party. An obvious example is that
if the hostile party interferes with a third state's general (i.e., non-contra-
band) trade with its foe, then it is responsible for paying compensation for
the damage done.
m. The Relation of the Law of Hostility to General International Law
It is not suggested that the proposed law of hostility should displace any
part of modern international law, except the law relating to belligerent
rights and to neutrality. Sometimes, the law of hostility allows clarifica-
tions in areas where there are presently doubts. In other cases, it entails
some additional considerations. The following areas of law are of rele-
vance in this regard.
A. Duty of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
There is, of course, a general duty on the part of U.N. member-states to
settle disputes peacefully.3 4 However, there can be some uncertainty as to
when or whether a "dispute" in the proper sense really exists.3 5 The law
relating to hostility will help deal with that problem by applying the princi-
ple referred to above-any attempted exercise of hostility-related rights
will irrebuttably remove any doubts as to the existence of a dispute. Viola-
tion of the duty to resolve disputes peacefully would constitute a legal
wrong on the part of the intransigent party independent of the merits of
any underlying dispute. The harmed party would receive appropriate
compensation in due course.
B. The Prohibition Against the Use of Force
The main point here has been mentioned already. One of the most
important advantages of recognition of the proposed legal status of hostil-
ity is that it enables us to conclude, without ambiguity, that article 2 (4) of
33. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
34. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
35. The mere holding by two parties of opposing attitudes towards a question does
not necessarily mean that there is a "dispute" between them in the legal sense. See
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, paras. 34-43 (Apr. 26) in
which the Court confirmed that the existence of a "dispute" within the meaning of the
treaty in question was "a matter for objective determination." Id. para. 35. More specif-
ically, a dispute in the legal sense "presuppose[s] a claim arising out of the behavior of
or a decision by one of the parties .... " Id. para. 42.
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the U.N. Charter has abolished the legal institution of war. The ban on
the use of force as stated in article 2(4) is an overriding principle of the
highest importance 3 6 There is no suggestion that the status of hostility or
the content of any hostility-related right should constitute an exception to
it.
At the same time, it must be appreciated that the article 2(4) prohibi-
tion does not purport to cover all uses of force by states. It applies to uses
of force by states against one another in their international relations. It accord-
ingly does not apply to mere precautionary measures, such as visit and
search, or to any police or law-enforcement measures that states under-
take. This is an important point because it removes doubts that might
arise concerning visit and search and contraband.
Regarding visit and search, it might be argued that the capture and
condemnation of ships resisting this prerogative would violate article 2 (4).
This would be incorrect, however, because the capture and adjudication
would be in the nature of a police or law-enforcement activity against indi-
viduals. Therefore, it would not amount to a use of force by states "in their
international relations" (i.e., in state-to-state relations), as article 2(4)
requires. Nor would it be a use of force "against the territorial integrity or
political independencd' of the resisters' home state.
The same considerations apply to contraband. The exercise of the
right to interfere with contraband traffic, although admittedly forcible in
character, should be seen as merely a police measure exercised against the
contraband traders as individuals rather than against the traders' home
state. This is a venerable principle of the law of neutrality, sometimes
aptly termed the "commercial adventure" principle. According to this
principle, contraband traders were seen to be involved in a private "com-
mercial adventure" which was subject to disruption by belligerents, and
the traders' action was not attributed to their home state, so no state
responsibility arose on the part of the neutral country.37 Force, therefore,
was admittedly applied, but only as a police-like measure against individu-
als, not against other states.
This approach to the question clearly involves a somewhat restrictive
reading of the article 2 (4) prohibition against the use of force. Many law-
yers will understandably see this as a dangerously crabbed or over-literal
interpretation. Notice, however, that this restrictive interpretation only
applies to relations between hostile states and third parties. The most
important aspect of the ban on force is its effect on the hostile states them-
selves inter se-and international law remains as free as before to interpret
36. See supra note 9.
37. See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822), in which Justice
Story characterized the carriage of contraband by nationals of a neutral state as "a com-
mercial adventure which no [neutral] nation is bound to prohibit; and which only
exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation." Id. at 340. For clear
(and approving) expositions of the principle, see William C. Morey, The Sale of Muni-
tions of War, 10 AM.J. INT'L L. 467, 472-80 (1916); Charles Noble Gregory, Neutraity and
the Sale of Arms, 10 AM.J. INT'L L. 543 (1916).
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article 2(4) strictly in that regard.38
C. Traditional Belligerents' Rights
By virtue of the article 2(4) abolition of the legal concept of war, belliger-
ents' rights can now be said, likewise without ambiguity, to have been abol-
ished. Any unilateral use of force in violation of article 2 (4) confers upon
the user none of the traditional belligerents' rights, either against its foe or
against third parties. The state has, ex hypotheosi, violated the law.
It may be contended, however, that the proposed concept of hostility-
related rights merely takes the former belligerents' rights and continues
them under another name. After all, the principal rights of visit and
search and interference with contraband trade are, for all intents and pur-
poses, straightforward borrowings from the traditional belligerents' rights
against neutrals.
This criticism has a superficial plausibility because the hostility-related
rights of interference with contraband trade and of visit and search are
clearly borrowed from the traditional law of neutrality. On inspection,
however, this proposition may be readily seen to be invalid. Visit and
search is the only erstwhile belligerent right which is carried over into the
hostility field virtually without modification. The law of contraband, as
noted above, is carried over only with some important modifications
designed to promote the interests of the world community at large, not of
the hostile parties themselves.
It should be recalled that a large portion of the catalogue of erstwhile
belligerent rights will not be allowed. For example, the entire corpus of
belligerents' rights against one another-such as the right to kill one's
enemy, to capture prisoners of war, to occupy enemy territory, and so
forth-is condemned to oblivion on the grounds of incompatibility with
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In addition, many of the traditional
rights of belligerents against neutrals-such as the right to sink neutral
ships in certain circumstances, the right of blockade, and the right to take
forcible reprisals-are likewise rejected.
D. The Law of Neutrality
A major advantage of the concept of hostility is that it permits a ready
resolution of the question of whether the traditional law of neutrality con-
tinues to exist. With the legal state of war unambiguously abolished, the
answer is that traditional neutrality properly speaking is likewise abolished.
It is equally clear, though, that an analogue of neutrality must exist
vis-d-vis the proposed state of hostility. This is unavoidable-when two
countries find themselves in a state of hostility vis-d-vis one another, the
other states in the world will be allowed to continue to have normal rela-
38. For a view opposing narrow readings of article 2(4), see BROWNLE, supra note 1,
at 265-68. For a view advocating a flexible reading of article 2(4), see W. Michael Reis-
man, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 642
(1984).
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tions with each. The situation here, in fact, is so closely analogous to tradi-
tional neutrality that there seems little harm in continuing to use the term
as long as it is understood that "neutrality" now refers not to a state of war
but rather to a state of hostility. The relations between hostile states and
neutral ones (in the now-proper sense of the term) will be regulated, as
noted above, by rules of international law which will be analogous, but not
identical, to the traditional rules of neutrality.39
E. The Laws of the Conduct of Armed Conflict
The laws governing the conduct of armed conflict, including the corpus of
humanitarian law, would be unaffected by this new body of law. These
would neither be enlarged, reduced, nor altered in character by the law of
hostility.
F. The Right of Self-defense
The relation of hostility-related rights to the right of self-defense raises
some of the most interesting questions. It may be objected that these pro-
posed hostility-related rights are unnecessary because modern interna-
tional law has already recast the old belligerents' rights into adjuncts of
self-defense. 40 There is certainly support in state practice for this proposi-
tion. The clearest example is the British government's position regarding
Iran's policy of visiting and searching merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf
during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.41 The British government con-
ceded the legality of the practice, carefully characterizing it as an incident
of Iran's right of self-defense. 42 Similarly, when the United States resorted
to measures affecting third parties during the Vietnam War, most notably
the Cambodian intervention of 1970 and the mining of Haiphong Harbor
in 1972-73, it justified them on self-defense grounds, not as exercises of
traditional belligerents' rights.43 Israel did the same when it sent troops
into Lebanon in 1982. 44
39. For similar views, see Fenwick, supra note 2.
40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
41. For Iran's formal announcement of the policy, see U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess.,
Supp. forJuly, Aug. & Sep. 1985, at 127, U.N. Doc. S/17496 (1985).
42. United Kingdom Materials on International Law, 1984 Bart. Y.B. INT'L L. 405, 552-
53; United Kingdom Materials on International Law, 1986 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 487, 583-84.
Note that this position implies a conclusion on the part of the United Kingdom that
Iraq was the aggressor in the struggle and Iran the defender. The United States also
conceded the legality of the Iranian practice although it was less forthcoming about the
precise legal basis. See Richard W. Murphy, Review of Developments in the Middle Eas
DEP'T ST. Buut, Mar. 1986, at 39, 41. France at first objected to the Iranian practice
but later acquiesced to it. A. Goioa & N. Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States'
Commercial Rights and Duties, in THE GuLF WAR OF 1980-1988, supra note 3, at 221, 238.
43. On the Cambodian intervention, see John R. Stevenson, Statement of the Legal
Adviser, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1970). On the mining of Haiphong Harbor, see U.N.
SCOR, 27th Sess., Supp. for Apr., May &June 1972, at 44, U.N. Doc. S/10631 (1972).
44. U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., Supp. for July, Aug. & Sep. 1982, at 4, U.N. Doc. S1
15271 (1982).
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There is, however, a serious objection to this line of analysis. It seems
illogical-if not dangerous-to hold that self-defense-related rights are
exercisable against innocent third parties as well as against actual attack-
ers. Admittedly, judicial authority on this point is not dispositive.45 But if
the overall policy of international law is to minimize the use of force, then
it would seem at least prima facie inadvisable to allow self-defense measures,
which of course include the use of force, against third parties. Hostility-
related measures, in contrast, will be permitted to affect third parties-but
with the important proviso that they cannot entail any use of force.
There are, accordingly, three fundamental distinctions between the
right of self-defense on the one hand and the hostility-related rights on
the other. The first is that hostility-related rights will have their primary
sphere of operation vis-d-vis third parties, while self-defense rights have
theirs vis-d-vis aggressors. The second is that self-defense may involve the
use of force, whereas hostility-related action may not. The third is that
hostility-related rights are to be governed by a fixed code of rules rather
than by the more open-ended principles of necessity and proportionality
that govern self-defense.
At this point, it is appropriate to comment on the specific question of
blockade. The prohibition against blockade constitutes perhaps the most
striking departure of the proposed law of hostility from the traditional law
of war and neutrality. Although the law of hostility rejects blockade as a
genera4 inherent right of states, it may permit blockade when used as a
bona fide measure of self-defense. This approach to blockade admittedly
poses some difficulties. The principal problem is that blockade seems to
violate the proposition that self-defense measures be permitted only
against attackers and not against third parties. The response is that, in
particular cases of self-defense, the defeat of an armed attack will necessi-
tate the halting of all trade between the attacking state (or a portion
thereof) and the outside world. Because of this state of affairs, any per-
sons attempting to conduct trade through a blockade would thereby, in
legal terms, assimilate themselves to the rival state. Consequently, meas-
ures taken against them would not constitute measures against third
parties.
This means that blockades, as a sub-category of self-defense measures,
would be subject to the two key conditions governing self-defense action:
necessity and proportionality.46 This point has significant implications.
According to the principle of necessity, blockades would only be permissi-
ble under certain restricted circumstances (i.e., when necessity was actually
present) -it would not be an automatic right of self-defenders. The princi-
45. In the Nicaragua case, the World Court confirmed that the right of self-defense
arises only in response to an armed attack. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 195 [hereinaf-
ter Nicaragua v. U.S.]. But it did not state whether the self-defense rights are exercisable
only against the attacking party.
46. On the principle of necessity, see BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 41-44. On propor-
tionality, seeJost Delbr-ick, Proportionality, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 396, 396-98 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984).
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ple of proportionality would imply that only certain types of trade could be
stopped (i.e., trade in goods that furthered the aggression). The principle
of proportionality would furthermore imply that the self-defending state
would only be entitled to divert neutral ships away from the blockaded
area, not to capture and confiscate them. Blockades that failed to meet
the necessity and proportionality tests would, of course, not be bona fide
self-defense measures but rather mere acts of aggression, as provided by
the U.N. General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression." 47
This proposed modification of traditional blockade law and practice
is reminiscent of the rules governing pacific blockade.48 As early as 1887,
the Institute of International Law adopted a declaration to the effect that,
in cases of pacific blockade, captured ships were merely to be sequestered
and then returned to the target state at the conclusion of the dispute.49
This modified policy has also been followed in cases of true war blockades
(blockades enforced against third parties). An early example was the Brit-
ish-German blockade of Venezuela in 1902-03.5 0 A more recent and perti-
nent illustration is the United States closure of Haiphong Harbor by
means of mines in 1972-73, 51 which it justified not as a belligerent right per
se but rather as a self-defense measure.52 The United States made no
attempt to capture or confiscate ships approaching the target area.
Because it effected the closure by mines rather than by a blockading
squadron, ships which had intended to enter the harbor were free to go
elsewhere instead, as just proposed.
G. Reprisal
To a large extent, the considerations applying to self-defense apply also to
reprisal. There have been doubts, extending back at least as far as the
Napoleonic wars, as to whether reprisal measures ought to be permitted
against parties other than the actual wrongdoer. British prize courts took
the view that there was no absolute prohibition in international law against
belligerent reprisals that had effects on neutrals as well as on the enemy.53
Nor, however, was the wronged belligerent entitled to take reprisals with-
out any heed whatever to the interests of neutrals. Instead, the lawfulness
was to be decided in each particular case by a balancing exercise or pro-
portionality test the reprisals taken should not involve "greater hazard or
prejudice to the neutral trade... than was commensurate with the gravity
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48. A pacific blockade is a blockade outside the framework of a war and enforced
only against the vessels of the target country, not against those of third states.
49. INSTITuT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, TABLEAu Gf-PtRALE DES RtsOLUTIONS (1873-
1956), at 170 (Hans Wehberg ed., 1957).
50. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 46, at 148.
51. There may be some doubt as to whether the term "blockade" is really an appro-
priate label for this effort. For the view that its overall effect was essentially that of a
traditional blockade, see H. LEVIE, MNEr WARFARE AT SEA 150-57 (1992).
52. U.N. SCOR, 27th Sess., Supp. for Apr., May &June 1972, at 44, U.N. Doc. S/
10631 (1972).
53. The Stigstad, [1919] App. Cas. 279 (P.C. 1918) (appeal taken from P.).
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of the enemy outrages and the common need for their repression. '54 It is
not difficult to see that belligerents and neutrals, in the heat of battle,
could easily arrive at different conclusions applying so general a test.
The proposed law of hostility deals with this question by a flat prohibi-
tion on reprisal measures against third parties. Reprisal action, like self-
defense, is permissible only against actual wrongdoers. The law of hostility
thus rejects the British prize court holdings. It is proposed that this princi-
ple would apply to all reprisals, whether forcible or not, although it should
be recalled that according to the prevailing wisdom (with some support
from the World Court), forcible reprisals are unlawful in any event.55
IV. Illustrations from State Practice
It should not be thought that this proposed body of law relating to hostil-
ity is utopian in character. On the contrary, there are a host of examples
in recent state practices which fruitfully illustrate the manner in which the
law of hostility would operate in practice and of the advantages that it
would afford. Sometimes, important dilemmas or uncertainties can be
resolved using this new analysis. Sometimes different results will be
reached. Sometimes the same results will be reached, but on different
grounds. The following examples are illustrations.
A. The "Secondary" Arab Boycott Against Israel
The Arab boycott of Israel provides an excellent illustration of the concep-
tual advantages that an analysis based on the concept of hostility affords.
The "primary" boycott by the Arab states against Israel itself is generally
thought to be lawful. The "secondary" boycott, targeted against third par-
ties who deal with Israel in such a way as to enhance its military strength, is
of more doubtful legality.
56
Under conventional legal analysis, commentators have provided two
legal justifications for the secondary Arab boycott. One is that like the
54. The Leonora, [1919] App. Cas. 974,992 (P.C. 1919) (appeal taken from P.). See
also The Stigstad, supra note 53, at 289, which stated that a reprisal measure affecting
neutrals is permissible so long as it does not inflict "hardship excessive either in kind or
in degree upon neutral commerce .... "
55. The World Court's treatment of the matter in Nicaragua v. U.S. was rather more
tentative than might be supposed at first. Although the Court quoted the prohibition
against forcible reprisals contained in the General Assembly's Declaration on Friendly
Relations, GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970), it did so in the context of pointing out that some uses of force, such as
forcible reprisals, are less grave than others. The Court also went no further than to say
that it "can ... draw on the formulations" in that resolution to determine the law in this
area and that the adoption of this resolution "affords an indication" of the opiniojuris of
states as to customary international law on this point. It should also be noted that the
question of the legality of forcible reprisals was not before the Court at the time. At the
same time, there can be little doubt that the Court revealed an inclination to hold that
forcible reprisals are unlawful. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 191, at 101.
56. On the Arab boycott generally, see AARONJ. SARNA, Boycorr AND BLAcKUST: A
HISTORY OF ARAB EcoNoMIc WARFARE AGAiNT ISRAEL (1986).
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primary boycott, it is a self-defense measure by the Arab states.57 The
other is that it is a sovereign-right measure, a mere exercise by the Arab
states of their normal sovereign right to decide whether to permit trading
with other countries or not, and if so, on what terms. 58 Both of these
defenses are, in their present form, of doubtful persuasiveness.
The self-defense justification has several clear weaknesses. One is that
self-defense measures are not legally permitted except in the face of an
actual "armed attack."59 It is also questionable whether self-defense meas-
ures are permitted against third parties as well as against attackers. The
weakness of the sovereign-right justification lies in the fact that the exer-
cise of this purported sovereign right involves an interference with the
basic right of third states to trade freely.60 In such a case as this, when
rights or claimed rights clash with one another, some kind of balancing
exercise is called for.
61
Some have argued that the Arab boycott is unlawful because it is forci-
ble in character, thereby amounting in its own right to a direct violation of
article 2(4).62 This argument, however, is not persuasive because it seems
doubtful that mere economic pressure can be considered, at least in the
general case, to be a use of force. The majority of international lawyers
hold this view.
63
57. Commissioner General Mahgoub, Statement on the Arab Boycott, March 5, 1975, in
2 CONFERENCE ON TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC BoycoTrs AND COERCION: MATERIALS ON
THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS BOYCOTT 114 (Roy M. Mersky ed., 1978).
58. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order,
16 VA.J. INT'L L. 261 (1976).
59. U.N. CHlARTER art. 51.
60. The World Court, in Niwaragua v. U.S., referred to the U.S. infringement of "the
freedom of communications and of maritime commerce." Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.CJ.
14, para. 214, at 111-12. In that case, the interference was by the crude means of plac-
ing mines around the ports of the enemy state. In the case of the Arab boycott, the
interference takes the more subtle form of using economic power to halt trading by
third states with the enemy. But the basic right interfered with is the same in both
cases.
61. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 983 (1974);Jordan J. Paust &
Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace, 68 Am. J. INr'L
L. 410 (1974).
63. See, e.g., LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNrrED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 104 (2d ed. 1949); C.H.M. Waldock, The Regu-
lation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 493-94
(1952-11); BowErr, supra note 1, at 148-49; Max Sorensen, Principes de Droit International
Public 101 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 236-37 (1960-I); BROwNUE, supra note 1, at 361-62; Louis
Dubouis, L'Embargo dans la Pratique Contemporaine, 1967 ANNUArRE FRANCAS DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL (Centre National de a Recherche Scientifique) 99, 109-10; Richard B.
Lillich, The Status of Economic Coercion under International Law: United Nations Norms, 12
TEx. INT'L L.J. 17, 18-19 (1977); Charles. Leben, Les Contre-Mesures Inter-dtatiques et les
RNactions i lIllicitj dans la Sociitdlnternationale, 1982 ANNUAiPE FRANCAIS DE DRorr INTER-
NATIONAL (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) 9, 67; Michel Virally, Article 2,
Paragraphe 4, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: CommENTArRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 113,
120-21 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds., 1985); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The
United Nations and Economic Coercion, 18 REVUE BELGE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 9, 10-11
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Although the Arab boycott does not constitute a use of force, it is
nevertheless an act of hostility directed ultimately against Israel though
proximately against third parties trading with Israel. It therefore makes
eminent good sense to deal with the boycott under the rubric of the law of
hostility. This analysis readily shows the secondary component of the boy-
cott to be unlawful. It cannot be an exercise of a belligerent right, because
belligerent rights do not exist. Nor can it be a self-defense measure,
because those may be directed only against attacking parties, not against
neutrals. It also cannot be a lawful reprisal against the Western states for
violations of the law of neutrality, because that law no longer exists. Nor
can it be justified as a hostility-related right for the reason given above: it
is a violation of the rights of third parties to maintain normal, non-contra-
band relations with the contending parties.
B. The Western Strategic Embargo Against the Socialist States
Similar considerations arise when examining the Western strategic
embargo against the socialist countries. The embargo was, in effect, a con-
traband regime in that it was designed to prevent armaments from reach-
ing the socialist countries from the West, together with other goods and
technology that might enhance the war-making capacity of those coun-
tries. The embargo was not technically a contraband regime because
there was no actual war in progress.
This case nicely illustrates one of the central dilemmas that this con-
cept of hostility-related rights will pose for states. If the relationship is
truly one of hostility, then states would have the right to use police powers
to prevent third parties from delivering the designated contraband goods
and technology to the other side. But a price must be paid for claiming
and exercising such a right: under the law of hostility, the U.N. Security
Council and not the contending parties themselves determines what to
include in the contraband list. In other words, the enforcement rights
available to the hostile parties will be broad, but the hostile parties must
forfeit the crucial right to determine the contraband list.
An alternative for the parties concerned is to refrain from designating
the relationship as hostile and to seek, instead, to halt the flow of key
goods and services from their own territories by the use of their ordinary
sovereign rights under general international law. If this option is chosen,
the contending states retain the key right to decide what goods or technol-
ogy to try to halt-they preserve the right to fix their own contraband list.
However, they have a right only to halt the flow of goods and technology
from their own territories through third states to the target countries. They
may not interfere with the right of third countries to conduct their own
trading with the target states. Here again, the analogy with the traditional
law of neutrality is clear.
(1985); and Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International
Law, 79 AM.J. INT'L L 405, 408-10 (1985).
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This alternative strategy is the one that the Western states actually
adopted in their strategic-embargo effort. They acted through COCOM to
coordinate the exercise of their ordinary sovereign rights with a view to
preventing the exporting, whether directly or indirectly, of designated
goods and technology from their home territories to the socialist coun-
tries.64 The contrast with the Arab boycott should be noted. The Arab
states actually sought to stop economic contacts with Israel that originated
from third countries, while the strategic embargo did not. It was instead
confined to preventing the use of third countries as conduits between
COCOM states and socialist countries. Referring again to the analogy with
the traditional law of neutrality, the strategic embargo sought to apply an
analogy of the continuous-voyage principle.
65
This continuous-voyage-style strategy has sometimes proved difficult
to implement. On several occasions, most notably in the Siberian pipeline
crisis of 1982, it involved the Western alliance states in serious disputes as
to how far the embargoing states could go in regulating the flow of goods
and technology that originated within their territories. 66 The law of hostil-
ity could hardly be guaranteed to eliminate such difficulties entirely, but it
would posit several clear points of principle that would govern them. One
principle is that if hostility-related rights are claimed, then all of the con-
straints associated with those rights must be observed. If, in the alterna-
tive, only ordinary sovereign rights are utilized, the guiding principle is
that the embargoing states are only entitled to control goods and technol-
ogy originating in their own territories. They are not entitled to impede
the flow of foreign-origin goods to the target states-neutral trade must be
left free. Finally, if this sovereign-right alternative is adopted, only the
ordinary prerogatives of states under the general international law ofjuris-
diction may be utilized.
Adopting these standards, it seems likely that the United States went
beyond its legal limits in the Siberian pipeline affair of 1982 to the extent
64. For a discussion of the history, operations, and future of COCOM, see UNITED
STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE 153-70
(1979); John P. Hardt & Kate S. Tomlinson, The Potential Role of Western Policy Toward
Eastern Europe in East-West Trade, in ECONOMIC RELATIONS wrrH THE U.S.S.R.: IssuES FOR
THE WESTERN ALUANCE 79 app. 5A at 111-27 (Abraham S. Becker ed., 1983); Cecil
Hunt, Multilateral Coordination in Export Controls-The Role of CoCom 14 U. TOL L. REv.
1285 (1983). See also CONTROLLING EAST-WEST TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
POWER, PoLrrICs, AND POUCIES (Gary K. Bertsch ed., 1988) (discussing Western efforts
to control strategic trade and technological relations with communist economies).
65. The continuous-voyage principle was designed to stop the use of neutral states
as conduits to enemy countries. The ordinary rule was that a belligerent had no right
to interfere with any trade to a neutral country. If, however, the neutral country was
merely a way-station en route to the enemy, the continuous-voyage principle held that
contraband trade to a neutral state could be halted by a belligerent if the contraband
goods were intended merely to be taken through the neutral state to the enemy and not
to be used in the neutral country itself. On the continuous-voyage principle, see gener-
ally HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE DOcTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE (1926).
66. For a discussion of this crisis, see ANTHONYJ. BLrNREN, ALLY vs. ALLY: AMERICA,
EuROPE, AND THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE CRISIS (1987) (focussing on the discord between the
United States and its Western European allies on the question of East-West trade).
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that it sought to control the flow of goods originating in foreign countries.
Even if the goods were produced by an American subsidiary, and even if
all punitive measures were imposed wholly in U.S. territory, the breach of
this basic principle put the U.S. action outside the law.
C. The Cuban "Quarantine" of 1962 by the United States
The Cuban "quarantine" also lends itself well to analysis under the pro-
posed law of hostility. The United States justified its quarantine action
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as a regional enforcement mea-
sure under article 53 of the U.N. Charter.6 7 This defense, however, is
doubtful, because article 53 requires the authorization of the Security
Council for a lawful regional enforcement measure and there was no such
authorization in this case. It is therefore hardly surprising that some
defenders of the legality of the quarantine adopted other justifications
instead, such as self-defense. 68 But self-defense is not very convincing
either, since there was no armed attack on the United States either by
Cuba or by any country supplying weapons to Cuba.
69
The Cuban "quarantine" is better analyzed in terms of the proposed
concept of hostility. It then becomes clear that the quarantine was lawful,
if at all, as an exercise of the hostility-related right of contraband. Both
Cuba and the Soviet Union denounced the measure as a blockade,70 but
that view was misconceived. The stated purpose of the quarantine was not
to halt all trade between Cuba and the outside world, as a blockade is
designed to do, but only to "interdict... the delivery of offensive weapons
and associated materiel [sic] to Cuba"-a classic contraband formula.
71
Consistent with contraband practice, the proclamation duly specified the
types of weapons and related materials whose delivery would be halted.
The United States was to enforce the measure by visiting and searching
third-party vessels on the high seas-another obvious element of classic
contraband law. Ships failing to comply with the visit and search process
would be taken into custody.
67. Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515
(1963); ABRAM CHAws, THE CuBAN MissiLE Cmisis (1974).
68. For a defense of this view, see remarks by Dr. Charles G. Fenwick in Cuban
Quarantine: Implications for the Future, 57 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 1, 17 (1963).
69. Some commentators, such as Professor Myres S. McDougal, took a broader view
of self-defense, contending that it was applicable in situations other than those of an
actual armed attack. Id. at 15-16. In Nicaragua v. U.S., however, the World Court
rejected this broad view of self-defense. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.CJ. 14, para. 195. The
Court was quite explicit on the subject of supplying weapons to a country: such a sup-
ply does not amount to an armed attack although it can constitute a use of force con-
trary to article 2(4) of the Charter. Id. para. 195, at 104.
70. U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., Supp. for Oct., Nov. & Dec. 1962, at 148, U.N. Doc. S/
5183 (1962); U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., Supp. for Oct., Nov. & Dec. 1962, at 149, U.N.
Doc. S/5186 (1962). See also W.T. Mallison, Jr, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-
Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid under International Law, 31 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962).
71. Proclamation No. 3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10401 (1962), reprinted in 47 DEP'T ST.
BuLL. 717 (1962).
Vol 28
1995 Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict
The Cuban quarantine policy foreshadowed the proposed law relat-
ing to hostility in its provision for third-party ships found to be carrying
offending goods. There were to be no prize proceedings. Instead, any
such vessel was to be "directed to proceed to another destination of its
own choice." 72 This is precisely the policy proposed above as a general
rule of the law relating to hostility.
Some scholars condemned the quarantine policy as an unlawful
threat or use of force contrary to article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter.
73 Even
its defenders conceded that it was forcible in character.74 Such criticisms
miss the point, however, by seeing the quarantine as a use of force against
Cuba. Forcible action was involved in the quarantine, but it was against
third parties attempting to supply the specified types of weaponry to Cuba
rather than against Cuba itself.75
A more valid criticism of the quarantine policy, which several states
(e.g., Sweden and Poland) made, was that it was an unlawful interference
of their normal right to trade with Cuba.76 The quarantine obviously did
interfere with third-party trade with Cuba-that was its explicit purpose.
Using the present analysis, however, one would probably be able to justify
the policy. A genuine crisis had occurred, and a halting of an influx of
weaponry was a sensible policy pending attempts at a peaceful resolution
(which, in this case, succeeded). Nevertheless, the application of the pro-
posed law of hostility would have made some difference. It would have
imposed a firm duty of third-party dispute settlement on the two parties.
It would also have charged the U.N., rather than the United States, with
the responsibility of defining the types of weapons to be interdicted.
77
D. The Iraqi "Tanker War" of the 1980s
This is perhaps the most instructive illustration of all. When Iraq insti-
tuted its "tanker war" against vessels loading oil at the Iranian port of
Kharg Island, it might have resorted to several justifications with varying
degrees of persuasiveness. Iraq might have justified it as an exercise of the
traditional belligerent right of blockade. Alternatively, it might have con-
72. Id. Only if a contraband-carrying ship refused to avail itself of this opportunity
would it be taken to an American port for "appropriate disposition." The occasion did
not arise for the United States to expand on this delphic expression.
73. Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 556-57 (1963).
74. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T ST. BuLL
763, 764 (1962); Meeker, supra note 67, at 523.
75. Admittedly, it may be argued that the real foe of the United States was not Cuba
but the Soviet Union, because it was the Soviet Union which maintained exclusive con-
trol over the weaponry and so presented the real threat to the United States. That may
have been so. But for present purposes, it is more important that the matter was not
treated on that footing. In the quarantine policy, no distinction was made between
Sovietvessels and those of any other state-the Soviet Union was treated as a third-party
supplier of weapons to Cuba.
76. NIcHoLAs TRAcy, ATrAcK ON MARITIME TRAnE 216-18 (1991).
77. These differences would probably have mattered little in the end. Genuine
efforts at peaceful settlement were made successfully in a relatively short period of time.
In addition, the American contraband list was very short. It seems unlikely that a U.N.-
compiled list would have differed significantly.
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tended that its actions were an exercise of the right of self-defense.
Stretching matters a bit, it might even have claimed that the policy was a
contraband measure-Iraq was preventing the inflow of foreign exchange
for war prosecution into Iran by preventing the exporting of oil which
earned that exchange.78 In fact, Iraq adopted none of these, but instead
resorted to a fourth justification: reprisal. The measures against the tank-
ers were said to be a retaliation for various allegedly unlawful measures
taken by Iran.7
9
Using conventional legal analysis, the reprisal issue poses some diffi-
culty. For one thing, the status of belligerent reprisals is still somewhat
unclear. The prevailing view, as noted above, is that forcible reprisals in
peacetime are unlawful. However, there is room for uncertainty as to the
legitimacy of reprisals during an armed conflict, even if the conflict is not
a formally declared war. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I
of 1977 thereto both clearly envisage that reprisals will take place during
armed conflicts and seek to regulate them.80
The proposed concept of hostility simplifies and clarifies the analysis.
Iraq's reprisal justification would be summarily rejected on two grounds:
first, forcible reprisals are in principle unlawful; and second, reprisal meas-
ures are in principle disallowed against third parties.
A possible justification on the ground of contraband would be
resolved with ease by consulting the U.N. contraband list. The matter
78. As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the general practice of
states was to regard money and precious metals as non-contraband. WLLIAM EDWARD
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 769 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 1924). Hall con-
ceded that, in theory, money could constitute conditional contraband, but only in the
event, highly unlikely in practice, that it was destined directly to the armed forces of the
enemy. Id. at 790.
79. U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., Supp. for Apr., May &June 1984, at 106, U.N. Doc. S/
16590 (1984). See also MaxwellJenkins, Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf.
The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
517 (1985) (examining the legality of attacks by Persian Gulf belligerents against neu-
tral commercial ventures).
80. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (prohibiting reprisals against prisoners of
war); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (prohibiting reprisals against
protected persons and their property); Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (prohibiting reprisals against
cultural property). The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
tocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, contains a host of prohibitions against repri-
sals: against wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons, and against medical personnel
tending to them (art. 20); against civilian populations (art. 51, § 6); against "civilian
objects" (art. 53); against "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian popula-
tion" (art. 54, § 4); against "the natural environment" (art. 55, § 2); and against "works
and installations containing dangerous forces" (art. 56, § 4). The implication of these
provisions would seem to be that reprisals are not altogether unlawful in principle. See
generaly FRrrs KALSHOVEN, BELUGc;ERENT REPIusALs (1971) (concluding that belligerent
reprisals, though not totally prohibited, are an unfortunate symptom of an anachronis-
tic world order).
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would not be subject to Iraq's unilateral proclamation.81 Even if foreign
exchange were on the U.N. contraband list, Iraq would have no right to
mount unprovoked armed attacks on oil exporters or even to confiscate
the oil itself. It would only be allowed to capture and sequester the oil
cargoes. An alternative would be to place the proceeds of the oil sales into
some kind of escrow account for the duration of the conflict.
82
A blockade justification would also clearly fail, as that traditional right
no longer exists. A claim that this was a blockade-like self-defense measure
would require a closer look, but on the facts of the particular case, this
argument fails to convince. Even conceding for the sake of argument that
Iraq's action met the necessity test, the "tanker war" clearly violated the
proportionality principle. The waging of outright armed attacks on neu-
tral shipping, or "large naval targets" in the convoluted Iraqi parlance,
seems a gravely excessive way of dealing with the threat at hand (the
replenishment of the enemy's treasury with foreign exchange).
Conclusion: The Utility of the Concept of Hostility
The advantages of recognizing the legal category of hostility are manifold
and may be set out very briefly. One crucial advantage is that it enables us
to maintain the U.N. Charter's prohibition against the use of force with
the fullest possible consistency. We can now say unambiguously that the
concept of a state of war is abolished. Consistency requires us to go on to
hold equally unambiguously that, if the institution of war is abolished,
then so is the set of belligerents' rights which arose out of it.
Finally, it is also now clear beyond a peradventure that the traditional
law of neutrality-the alter ego of war-is likewise obsolete. In place of
the erstwhile code of rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals, there
is the code of rules relating to hostility as outlined above. There is, to be
sure, a family resemblance, and sometimes a close one, between this new
law and the older one. But the law of hostility is a distinct and manifest
improvement upon the now-discarded law of neutrality. Perhaps the most
notable advantage is that the legal prerogatives of hostile states are not,
under this proposed analysis, inherent rights of states, but rather are the
creation and gift of the world community at large.
Indeed, the entire law of hostility is oriented towards the pursuit of
community goals rather than the national interests of the rival hostile par-
ties themselves. Hostility-related rights, accordingly, are required to
remain strictly within the ambit of the U.N. Charter's ban on the use of
force. Furthermore, the scope of these rights is subject to constant adjust-
ment by the community at large in the interest of the broad goal of fur-
thering international peace and security. This feature appears most vividly
81. It is suggested, incidentally, that the U.N. contraband list should not contain
foreign exchange, but that will be a decision for the United Nations to reach on its own.
82. Another possibility would be to allow Iraq to capture and destroy the oil car-
goes. It seems unreasonable on economic grounds, however, to allow the wanton
destruction of a non-renewable energy source.
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in the close association between the claiming of hostility-related rights and
the duty to submit to third-party dispute settlement.
The principal hostility-related right which is analogous to the former
rights of belligerents vis-vis neutrals-contraband-is reduced in sever-
ity. There is only a right to prevent delivery, not a right to confiscate and
convert to one's own use. In addition, the hostile states themselves will
not have the right to fix the contents of contraband lists. That right
belongs to the United Nations.
In addition, certain normal sovereign rights of states will be limited
when they are exercised in a hostility setting. For example, blacklisting
(secondary boycotting) will be prohibited, as will the taking of reprisal
action against third parties.
This new analysis also allows an important clarification, and limita-
tion, of the right of self-defense. Nations may mount forcible self-defense
measures only against actual armed attackers, not against third parties.
Blockade measures may be permitted on the thesis that they are measures
against persons who have affiliated themselves voluntarily with the oppos-
ing side. This rationale, however, allows blockades only if they meet the
strict twin tests of necessity and proportionality which govern self-defense
actions generally.
The above proposal is not utopian. On the contrary, there have been
foreshadowings of it in various crises which have actually occurred since
World War II, most notably, perhaps, in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Some will inevitably be unhappy at embarking upon an elaboration of
law relating to hostile relations between states. There is, apparently, a cer-
tain fear that, in so doing, international law would undermine its own
longer-term goal of promoting international peace and security. This fear
may have some basis if one is c6ncerned with a law of armed conflict. The
present proposal, however, is resolutely concerned with devising a new
corpus of law governing unarmed conflict. Harmony between states is,
undeniably, a finer state of affairs than hostility. However, it must be
remembered that this proposed law of hostility is designed to contain hos-
tile actions within carefully delimited and peaceful channels. Its overrid-
ing ethos, for the hostile parties, is constraint rather than license. As such,
the law of hostility is designed most emphatically to be a contribution
towards peace rather than a mere analogue of the traditional law of war.
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